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I. INTRODUCTION 
“Shape” means “a mode of existence or form of being having 
identifying features” or the “form or embodiment” of something.1  
Form and feature, in turn, arise from pressure and time.  Property 
law has a shape all its own: it exists as a unique body of law, with 
distinctive conventions and rules.  And that shape, those conventions 
and rules, derive from a variety of pressures that have, over the 
centuries, molded property law into its present form.  This Article 
seeks to understand and explain the shape of a particular area of 
property law—that of property forms. 
Of course, this attempt does not exist in a vacuum.  Indeed, the 
shape of property law and the source of that shape has received quite 
a lot of attention recently, and this Article is a direct response to that 
discussion.  In particular, Thomas W. Merrill and Henry E. Smith 
have written extensively about the numerus clausus principle, a term 
which means “the number is closed.”2  This is a shorthand way to 
 
* Assistant Professor of Law, St. Mary’s University School of Law. J.D., Brigham Young 
University; B.A., Brigham Young University.1 For these, and other, definitions of 
“shape,” see Shape, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/shape (last visited Jan. 28, 2014).  
 2  See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of 
Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 4 (2000). 
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describe the fact that property can only exist in certain standardized 
forms.3  Merrill and Smith have done much to popularize this 
concept as a unique and “deeply entrenched” element of property 
law.4  They argue that this limitation on the number of property 
forms has always existed in the underlying fabric of our common law 
and take the term from civil law countries, in which forms of 
ownership are clearly limited to those permitted under civil code.5  
They claim that the numerus clausus describes and explains why 
property law is so narrowly proscribed when it comes to common law 
restrictions on property types.6 
Further, Merrill and Smith have discussed, at great length, their 
view of what has led to this underlying limitation in property law.  
They argue that the pressure that created the numerus clausus effect 
comes from a self-imposed informational cost-benefit analysis 
wherein courts habitually focus on whether a new property type 
provides informational benefits that exceed the marginal 
informational costs thereof.7 
This description of and explanation for property law has 
generated significant interest over the last decade or so.  Many recent 
articles have focused on the concept of the numerus clausus, and 
either built upon or criticized the informational burden analysis 
developed by Merrill and Smith to explain it.8  Among those articles 
are two of mine, which built upon the numerus clausus as posited by 
Merrill and Smith.9  In A Theoretical Case for Standardized Vesting 
Documents (“SVD”), I first argued that this same cost-benefit analysis 
should apply to vesting documents, a very specific area of property 
law.10  Later, in Why is Property so Hard? (“WPH”), I expanded the 
 
 3  See generally id.; Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property 
in Law and Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357 (2001).   
 4  See Merrill & Smith, supra note 2, at 20.   
 5  See id. at 4. 
 6  See id. at 3–4.  This is in stark contrast to many other areas of property law.  See 
infra notes 29–36 and accompanying text.  
 7  Merrill & Smith, supra note 2, at 68–70. 
 8  See, e.g., Hanoch Dagan, The Craft of Property, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1517 (2003); 
Nestor M. Davidson, Standardization and Pluralism in Property Law, 61 VAND. L. REV. 
1597 (2008); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract, and 
Verification: The Numerus Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 
373 (2002); Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, The Objectivity of Well-Being and the Objectives of 
Property Law, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1669 (2003); Christina Mulligan, A Numerus Clausus 
Principle for Intellectual Property, 80 TENN. L. REV. 235 (2013). 
 9  See Chad J. Pomeroy, Why is Property so Hard?, 65 RUTGERS L. REV. 505 (2013) 
[hereinafter Pomeroy, WPH]; Chad J. Pomeroy, A Theoretical Case for Standardized 
Vesting Documents, 38 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 957 (2012) [hereinafter  Pomeroy, SVD]. 
 10  See Pomeroy, SVD, supra note 9, at 985.  Therein, documents that pass title 
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argument, contending that the informational burden analysis 
proposed by Merrill and Smith ought not to be limited to vesting 
heterogeneity.11  The argument was that the informational pressures 
identified by Merrill and Smith are present in all areas of property 
law and, therefore, the informational benefit analysis driving the 
numerus clausus ought to act on the many, many areas of variability 
laced throughout property law.12 
I continue to believe in the validity of these normative 
arguments.  I have come to believe, however, that the contrast 
between these arguments and the actual shape of property law belies 
the underlying validity of Merrill and Smith’s theses regarding the 
numerus clausus.  More specifically, the informational burden 
analysis propounded by Merrill and Smith does seem to explain the 
peculiar homogeneity associated with the fixed number of property 
forms available throughout our system.  But that analysis should also 
have the same effect on other areas of property law, and it clearly has 
not.13 
I believe that this failure to affect other areas of property law 
indicates that the numerus clausus does not arise due to the type of 
informational burden analysis propounded by Merrill and Smith.  In 
other words, if the courts truly adopted and applied the type of 
informational burden analysis described by Merrill and Smith, then 
they would do so in all areas of property law.  Property law is 
notoriously haphazard, in contrast to other areas of the law,14 and 
courts’ failure to remedy this heterogeneity (despite the same 
efficiency pressures extant in connection with property form issues) 
indicates that this judicial weighing of informational benefits and 
burdens simply does not occur in any area of the law.  Part II lays the 
foundation for this argument in greater detail by reviewing the 
 
from one party to another were referred to as “vesting documents,” and I focused on 
the similarity between the informational burdens associated with new property types 
and the heterogeneity costs associated with the many types of vesting documents that 
exist throughout the country (“vesting document heterogeneity”).  See id. at 985–87. 
 11  See Pomeroy, WPH, supra note 9, at 538–40. 
 12  Property is “that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and 
exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any 
other individual in the universe.”  2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *382.  And 
the heterogeneity of property law—that is, the different shape of the law in different 
jurisdictions—interferes with one’s ability to exclude because it creates confusion 
and interferes with the informational role of property.  See Pomeroy, WPH, supra note 
9, at 521. 
 13  See Pomeroy, SVD, supra note 9; Pomeroy, WPH, supra note 9. 
 14  Property law is a jumble of rules that have “been heaped one upon another 
for a course of seven centuries, without any order or method . . . .”  2 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *382–83. 
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numerus clausus and contrasting Merrill and Smith’s contentions 
with my own previous analyses. 
So if the pressure to create informational efficiencies does not 
lead to the numerus clausus, what does?  Part III answers this 
question by focusing on the historical setting in which property law 
developed.  Often overlooked, legal history frequently explains why 
and how the law developed.15  I believe that is the case here.  Rather 
than arising from subtextual analyses regarding informational 
burdens, homogeneity of property forms arises from a series of 
ancient statutes meant to protect governmental revenue.16  These 
statutes narrowed the type of property that one could create in order 
to restrict the manner in which people were able to transfer land, 
thus ensuring that the English crown’s transfer tax stream would not 
be jeopardized. 
The Article concludes that our property system, inefficient as it 
is, has been shaped by organic forces over the centuries.  The 
numerus clausus, then, is a valid description of the current shape of 
property law, but it does not arise in the manner that many 
academics and commentators claim. 
II. VARIATION IN PROPERTY LAW AND THE NUMERUS CLAUSUS 
In understanding the shape of property law, particularly as it has 
been studied and discussed recently, it is important to set the 
numerus clausus in its proper context.  In particular, property law is a 
varied and confused area of the law, and the numerus clausus is a 
peculiar exception to this.17 
A. Heterogeneity in Property Law 
As I discussed in WPH, property law is a difficult and somewhat 
dry subject because of its heterogeneity—there are numerous rules, 
and most of these rules differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.  In 
that article, I created a taxonomy that expressed this unique level of 
variability and described how it manifests itself.18  In particular, a 
cohesive taxonomy allowed me to identify categories of property law 
 
 15  See, e.g., Randall T. Shepard, The Importance of Legal History for Modern 
Lawyering, 30 IND. L. REV. 1 (1997). 
 16  Aside from historical support, see infra Part III, this proposition is also simple 
and logical.  See id.  I am, indeed, tempted to propose a sort of legal Occam’s Razor 
stating that, among competing hypotheses, the hypothesis that is attributable to 
governmental desire for revenue should be selected. 
 17  See Pomeroy, WPH, supra note 9, at 525. 
 18  See id. 
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and to examine how that law fractured throughout common law 
jurisdictions, a fruitful assessment, particularly when contrasted with 
other areas of the law.19 
The taxonomy I created was no great feat of originality and 
attempted to balance simplicity with depth by focusing on most 
lawyers’ shared background arising from first year property class.20  It 
did so in chart form, setting forth the basics of property law as 
follows:21 
 
 
 
This framework creates a consistent basis for comparison of the 
defined elements of property law.  For example, Merrill and Smith, in 
their discussions of the numerus clausus, focus on the uniformity of 
the “system of estates” (i.e., the types of property that are 
 
 19  See id.  Creating a taxonomy of this sort is admittedly problematic, as the law is 
constantly changing.  See, e.g., John Edward Cribbet, Concepts in Transition: The Search 
for a New Definition of Property, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 1–5 (1986).  See also Amnon 
Lehavi, The Taking/Taxing Taxonomy, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1235, 1242 (2010) (citing 
Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Of Property and Federalism, 115 YALE L.J. 72, 
74–75 (2005) (discussing the types of pressures that cause different jurisdictions to 
promulgate and enforce different property laws)).  Nevertheless, I created such a 
structure, believing that “a conceptual taxonomy of property law is ‘analytically and 
jurisprudentially essential’ for an analysis [involving] a wide-reaching examination of 
a potentially vast body of law.”  Pomeroy, WPH, supra note 9, at 509 (quoting Amnon 
Lehavi, The Taking/Taxing Taxonomy, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1235, 1242 (2010). 
 20  See Pomeroy, WPH, supra note 9, at 510. 
 21  This chart is taken directly from WPH.  See id.  It brings together many of the 
basic elements of property law, from the fundamentals through land use.  See id. 
(citing JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 18 (7th ed. 2010)).  Of course, there are 
many other legal concepts that could be included, and some of the concepts 
identified could arguably be place elsewhere.  But, ultimately, “perfection is not 
necessary.”  Id. at 511.  All that is necessary is a consistent attempt to give “a 
substantially coherent sense to what is undoubtedly a very muddy world.”  Lehavi, 
supra note 19, at 1278.   
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permitted).22 Similarly, in WPH, I examined the heterogeneity of 
“land transactions”23 and of “fundamentals.”24 
Engaging in this type of analysis, using the taxonomy presented 
above as a consistent backdrop, crystallizes the contextual setting of 
Merrill and Smith’s arguments and helps to explain why property law 
is such a difficult area of the law.25  Simply put, property is a 
mishmash of rules, with little consistency and no real guiding 
principles tying together the various jurisdictional rules and 
preferences.26  This is despite the central role that property plays in 
 
 22  See Merrill & Smith, supra note 2, at 23.   
 23  See generally Pomeroy, WPH, supra note 9, at 512–13.  The discussion in WPH 
regarding vesting documents was, in turn, based upon SVD.  SVD focuses on vesting 
documents, which would conceptually fall under “land transactions,” along with 
other concepts like brokers, contracts of sale, and financing.  See, e.g., DUKEMINIER ET 
AL., supra note 21, at xviii–xix.   
 24  In particular, I examined “rights in property,” which is classified under 
“fundamentals,” above.  See Pomeroy, WPH, supra note 9, at 514–16.  The concept of 
“rights in property” pertains to the claims that accrue to individuals based upon their 
ownership of property and is distinct from “system of estates,” which focuses on the 
accepted characteristics of particular property types.  See id. at 514 (citing Merrill & 
Smith, supra note 2, at 5–6).  I make this point in WPH by focusing on third party 
creditor rights in property.  See id. at 514–16.  That is, all common law jurisdictions 
recognize roughly the same suite of property types (possessory interests, concurrent 
interests, future interests); but there is significant variation from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction with respect to a creditor’s right to execute upon those acknowledged 
property types.  See id.; see also COMM’N ON THE BANKR. LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, 
H.R. REP. NO. 93-137, pt. 1, at 16 (1973); R. Paul Barkes, Jr., Untwisting the Strong-Arm: 
Protecting Fraud Victims from Bankruptcy Courts, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 653, 671 (1998) 
(“Relying on state law also resulted in inconsistent treatment of property in different 
states.  Because each state had its own property laws, certain categories of property 
would become part of the estate in one state but not in another.”).   
 25  It has been said that the study of property may “afford[] the student less 
amusement and pleasure” than other areas of the law.  2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES *382. 
 26  See Pomeroy, WPH, supra note 9, at 509.  Both the examination of land 
transactions (i.e., vesting documents) and fundamentals (i.e., rights in property) 
strongly support this statement.  With respect to vesting documents, there simply is 
no consistency from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.  See generally Pomeroy, SVD, supra 
note 9.  There are more than 3,000 counties, or county equivalents, where 
documents can be recorded.  See How Many Counties Are There in the United States?, 
USGS MULTIMEDIA GALLERY, http://gallery.usgs.gov/audios/124 (last updated Jan. 
09, 2013).  Each of those has their own recording system and customs.  See Dale A. 
Whitman, Are We There Yet? The Case for a Uniform Electronic Recording Act, 24 W. NEW 
ENG. L. REV. 245, 269 (2002).  This is due to the historical development of the 
American recording system and has resulted in a very clear, and very costly, example 
of widespread variability in property law wherein different jurisdictions permit the 
recording of different types of documents governed by different rules of 
construction and creation.  See John H. Scheid, Down Labyrinthine Ways: Recording Acts 
Guide for First Year Law Students, 80 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 91 (2002); see also 14 
RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 82.01(1)(a) (Michael Allan Wolf 
ed., 2009); Ray E. Sweat, Race, Race-Notice and Notice Statutes: The American Recording 
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our economy and the enormous amount of money involved. 27 
This heterogeneity is notable, in and of itself, and also because it 
is so unlike other areas of the law.  Contract law, for example, 
exhibits far more uniformity than property law.28  This makes the 
study and the practice of property law difficult; it is also problematic 
in that it creates a lot of cost. 
The broad-based heterogeneity described above compromises 
the efficiency of property law by undercutting the core function of 
property, which is to provide ready, relevant information to 
interested parties.29  Property rights exist with reference to a thing 
that is possessed or owned, and that “thing” communicates a bundle 
of information about itself, and about its owner’s rights and 
obligations, “to the world.”30  This communication, however, suffers 
(or disintegrates) if nobody can understand what property rights exist 
because there are no clear and consistent rules governing property.31 
And this is precisely what happens, time and again, with property 
law.  For example, with respect to vesting document heterogeneity, 
the certainty and confidence promoted by the American Recording 
System32 is significantly undermined because different jurisdictions 
 
System, PROB. & PROP. 27–28 (May–June 1989).  Similarly, with respect to rights in 
property, heterogeneity prevails.  See, e.g., Pomeroy, WPH, supra note 9, at 514–16.  
WPH focused on one aspect of this larger issue: that of creditor rights in debtor 
property.  See id. at 523.  Time and again, jurisdictions came to different conclusions 
based on different rules.  See id. at 516 (citing Harms v. Sprague, 473 N.E.2d 930, 
932–34 (Ill. 1984); Peter M. Carrozzo, Tenancies in Antiquity: A Transformation of 
Concurrent Ownership for Modern Relationships, 85 MARQ. L. REV. 423, 430 (2001)).   
 27  See Pomeroy, WPH, supra note 9, at 516 n.48 (pointing out that, in the context 
of creditor rights, more than $1.2 trillion of residential mortgages were extended to 
borrowers in 2011 alone).  
 28  In WPH, I created a taxonomy similar to that shown above, and examined how 
the structure of contract law varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.  See Pomeroy, 
WPH, supra note 9, at 518–21.  In short, there is not much variation.  See id. 
(examining the concepts of modification and unjust enrichment, reviewing 
numerous cases from varied jurisdictions, and concluding that the doctrines are 
largely consistent from jurisdiction to jurisdiction).   
 29  See Pomeroy, WPH, supra note 9, at 512. 
 30  Merrill & Smith, supra note 3, at 359. 
 31  See Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 577 
(1988) (indicating that property law functions properly when its rules “signal to all of 
us, in a clear and distinct language, precisely what our obligations are and how we 
may take care of our interests”).   
 32  See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Possession and Ownership: An 
Examination of the Scope of Article 9, 35 STAN. L. REV. 175, 183 (1983) (indicating that 
the manner in which the Recording System forces parties to record transfers of 
property interests creates certainty by ensuring recording and the concomitant 
propagation of information); see also Dan S. Schechter, Judicial Lien Creditors Versus 
Prior Unrecorded Transferees of Real Property: Re-Thinking the Goals of the Recording System 
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have different rules regarding which documents can, or must, be 
recorded and how those documents must be drafted and executed.33  
This makes title issues difficult and expensive to resolve, and so 
retards economic activity.34  Similarly, the heterogeneous nature of 
third-party creditor rights in debtor property also undercuts 
economic efficiency.  Just as a potential buyer or seller’s inability to 
determine title will prevent some transactions from occurring,35 a 
potential lender’s inability to forecast his remedies will prevent some 
loans from occurring.36  These are just a few examples of how the 
overriding goal of property—to provide information—is continually 
undermined by its heterogeneity. 
Contrast this with contract law.  Contract law is meant to ensure 
that parties can negotiate, act, and reach agreement with certainty.  
Jurisdictional uniformity supports this because parties have 
confidence that their contracts will be enforced, regardless of what 
jurisdiction controls—and this, in turn, stimulates positive market 
activity.37  When it comes to property law, however, parties cannot 
 
and Their Consequences, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 105, 109–19 (1988) (examining and 
refining, but ultimately supporting, this informational role of the recording system).   
 33  See Pomeroy, SVD, supra note 9, at 968. 
 34  See Pomeroy, SVD, supra note 9, at 969–71. 
 35  The cost of the lack of certainty described herein can be described either with 
reference to the transactions that do not occur or to the increased cost of those that 
do ultimately occur.  What is relevant is the loss of economic activity, however 
articulated. 
 36  See Pomeroy, WPH, supra note 9, at 516.  A creditor’s need to understand its 
potential rights in a potential debtor’s property is clear.  Potential lenders must 
continually assess the credit risk of every loan, and one of the ways they do so is to 
evaluate their ability to pursue non-performing debtors and their assets.  See id. at 
514–16 (noting that this is so regardless of whether the loan is secured or 
unsecured).  This is a matter of common sense, and any failure by a lender in doing 
this is likely to have significant, negative costs.  See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE 
OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF ‘08 AND THE DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION 18–29 (2009).  
Unfortunately, this task is difficult because the law varies so much from jurisdiction 
to jurisdiction.  See Pomeroy, WPH, supra note 9, at 515.  As such, lenders will fear the 
sorts of mistakes that may result from their ignorance of the different laws that 
prevail in different jurisdictions.  Accordingly, some lenders will end up not making 
loans that they would otherwise make, and some lenders will end up charging higher 
rates or fees than they would otherwise charge.  Again, what is relevant is the loss of 
economic activity, however articulated. 
 37  See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 117 (Aspen 8th ed. 
2011) (“The basic aim of contract law . . . is, by deterring people from behaving 
opportunistically toward their contracting parties, to encourage the optimal timing 
of economic activity and (the same point) obviate costly self-protective measures.”); 
Michael Trebilcock & Jing Leng, The Role of Formal Contract Law and Enforcement in 
Economic Development, 92 VA. L. REV. 1517, 1525–26 (2006) (“The purpose served by 
third-party enforcement [of contracts] is to provide stability and predictability as 
incentives to parties to engage in non-simultaneous exchanges.”). 
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have that sort of confidence, which thus dampens market activity and 
economic growth.38  This is suboptimal—or, more simply put, it is 
very expensive.39 
Why, then, is property so inefficient and so costly in comparison 
to other areas of the law?  There are a number of historical and 
substantive reasons that contribute to this heterogeneity.40  More than 
any other reason, though, the fixed nature of real property probably 
plays a significant role in encouraging different jurisdictions to play 
by different rules.41  Land does not move, so it is forever subject to a 
single jurisdiction.  This means that jurisdictions have had no 
 
 38  See Pomeroy, WPH, supra note 9, at 520–21.  “[I]nter-jurisdictional clarity of 
property law would permit parties to engage in property transactions without fearing 
unknown or unclear standards or rules.”  Id. at 520–21 n.64.  The current lack of 
clarity, then, “undermines commercial activity to the extent that it prevents anyone 
from engaging in a transaction they otherwise would have engaged in and to the 
extent that it imposes additional transactional costs on commercial activities.”  Id. at 
521 n.64; see also Trebilcock & Leng, supra note 37, at 1525–26. 
 39  The costs associated with this inefficiency should not be underestimated.  See 
Pomeroy, WPH, supra note 9, at 525.  As discussed therein, the title industry may 
serve as a rough proxy for these costs.  See id.  Title insurance indemnifies against the 
loss associated with nonconforming title.  See John C. Murray, Title and Survey Issues in 
Commercial Real Estate Transactions, in UNDERSTANDING THE SOPHISTICATED REAL ESTATE 
TRANSACTION 55, 57–58 (Practicing Law Institute ed. 2003).  Title can be 
nonconforming for a variety of reasons, but the confused status of property law likely 
represents some part of the problem, so it seems reasonable to cite title insurance 
expenses in gauging the magnitude of cost involved here.  And that outlay is 
significant, with the title industry generating $8.7 billion in fees in 2010 alone.  See 
Press Release, A.M. Best Co., A.M. Best Special Report: Despite Economic 
Turbulence, Title Industry Outlook Remains Stable (Oct. 10, 2011), available at 
http://www3.ambest.com/press/framepress.asp (accessed by selecting “October 
2011” from “View by Month” menu, then selecting article).  “In other words, the 
wide-ranging nature of property law, so hated by students, is also ultimately hated by 
market participants and practitioners.”  Pomeroy, WPH, supra note 9, at 521.   
 40  See, e.g., Pomeroy, SVD, supra note 9, at 964–67.  The role of property in our 
economy has changed over the years, and the law has had to change to keep pace.  
See id. at 963.  This sort of transformation leads to variability.  See also Dean Arthur R. 
Gaudio, Electronic Real Estate Records: A Model for Action, 24 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 271, 
272–74 (2002); see Pomeroy, SVD, supra note 9, at 965 n.45 (“At the time of America’s 
founding, land was shifting from its static role of wealth production to the dynamic 
role of a commodity to be bought and sold.”).  The basic nature of property is, itself, 
problematic in this context.  “By virtue of its durability, land invites an intricate 
layering of rights over time.”  Carol M. Rose, Canons of Property Talk, or, Blackstone’s 
Anxiety, 108 YALE L.J. 601, 6l4 (1998).  “Land, on the other hand, sticks around 
indefinitely, while claims against land can go on and on, in layer after layer, to be 
lost, found, banished, restored, relished, then lost again to longstanding practice and 
prescription.”  Id.  A tort or a contract exists, is adjudicated, and then goes away.  
There is no need to revisit the specific issues and facts over time.  This is not the case 
with property.  Its infinite existence means that claims pile up, year after year, and 
that the laws and rules created to address them do the same. 
 41  See Merrill & Smith, supra note 2, at 62. 
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incentive to accommodate stakeholders or to evolve in an attempt to 
“attract” real property commerce.42  There, is, however, a notable 
exception to this generally confused status. 
B. The Numerus Clausus 
As discussed in the introduction, when it comes to property 
forms, the law is narrow and reliable across jurisdictions.43  No matter 
where they are, people cannot create different, or “new,” types of 
property because courts consistently refuse to recognize all but a 
limited number of property types.44  Understanding the numerus 
clausus theory is important to understanding this Article; however, 
while important, this theory is ultimately unpersuasive for the reasons 
discussed below. 
 
 42  See Pomeroy, WPH, supra note 9, at 517 (citing 8 WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND ET AL., 
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES § 9-102:1 (2012) and contrasting the wildly 
fluctuating law for real property with “the relatively uniform law relating to personal 
property fostered by the Uniform Commercial Code,” which arguably resulted from 
states’ fear of capital flight to more accommodating jurisdictions). 
 43  See Pomeroy, WPH, supra note 9, at 526–27 (discussing the accepted suite of 
property forms, comprised of a discrete number of present property interests, future 
property interests, and non-possessory property interests).  But see Abraham Bell & 
Gideon Parchomosvsky, Of Property and Federalism, 115 YALE L.J. 72, 75–76 (2005) 
(arguing that “the numerus clausus description of property law as limited to [a] short 
menu is only partly accurate, because menus differ from state to state”); Nestor M. 
Davidson, Standardization and Pluralism in Property Law, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1597, 1600 
(2008) (“[A]lthough standardization is a stable feature of property law, the particular 
list of forms and their internal substance have always been dynamic . . . [yielding a] 
wonderful variety in the content of the list and in the substance of the forms at any 
given time and legal culture.”). 
 44  See Pomeroy, WPH, supra note 9, at 526–27; see also Keppell v. Bailey, (1834) 39 
Eng. Rep. 1042 (Ch.) 1049 (“[I]ncidents of a novel kind [cannot] be devised and 
attached to property at the fancy or caprice of any owner.”).  “Historically, the courts 
have enforced this rule either by striking down parties’ attempts to create new 
interests or by recasting any attempted ‘fancy’ as something else that qualifies as a 
more traditional property form.”  Pomeroy, WPH, supra note 9, at 526 (citing Merrill 
& Smith, supra note 2, at 11–12).  Merrill and Smith believe that our legal system 
honors this conception of property as a static catalog not subject to parties’ creativity.  
“They treat previously-recognized forms of property as a closed list that can be 
modified only by the legislature.”  Merrill & Smith, supra note 2, at 11.  This 
inelasticity holds true for virtually all categories and subcategories of “property 
form.”  See Pomeroy, WPH, supra note 9, at 526–27 (discussing the closed nature of 
possessory estates, future interests, concurrent interests, personal property, 
intellectual property, and creditor property rights).  Indeed, almost all attempts to 
exercise creativity in terms of property types arises in the context of trust law, in an 
attempt to work around the courts and their unwillingness to honor parties’ attempts 
at imagination.  See id. at 527.  Of course, while Merrill and Smith’s view on the 
numerus clausus “phenomenon” is widely cited, it is not the only explanation for the 
numerus clausus.  See, e.g., infra note 63. 
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1. The Numerus Clausus as an Exception to Heterogeneity 
Merrill and Smith’s numerus clausus theory attempts to explain 
why property law is uniquely uniform when it comes to the types of 
estates that courts will recognize.45  Merrill and Smith claim that this 
is a “stealth doctrine”46 and have largely developed it based on the 
case of Johnson v. Whiton.47  Therein, Royal Whiton left some land to 
his granddaughter “and her heirs on her father’s side.”48  The court 
treated this as an attempt to create a new property form and 
disallowed it, refashioning the devise as a fee simple absolute.49  
Merrill and Smith view this as a seminal case, as it fits their view of the 
numerus clausus as a widely applied, but never articulated, doctrine.50 
The reason for this doctrine, Merrill and Smith claim, is that 
new property types create costs in excess of their benefits and that 
courts can, and should, refuse to recognize them.51  More specifically, 
 
 45  See Merrill & Smith, supra note 2, at 69; see also Henry E. Smith, Community and 
Custom in Property, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 5 (2009).  See generally Michael A. 
Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163, 1165–66 (1999) 
(describing a “boundary principle,” which funnels property ownership into well-
known forms in order to keep “property categories from each other and help to keep 
resources well-scaled for productive use”).  Heller ultimately diverges from Merrill 
and Smith in a number of specifics, see infra note 63, but his explanation of the 
resistance to unending property types is helpful.  He speaks in terms of “legal 
things.”  See id. at 1176.  According to Heller, “[w]ith legal things, it is the fee simple 
in Blackacre, not Blackacre itself, that is the core of private property.  Halved, the 
legal thing may yield a present and a future interest, or a freehold and a non-
freehold estate.”  Id.  This fragmentation and sub-classification is fine, to some 
extent.  However, “[a]s with physical fragmentation, at some point, preserving 
fragments of legal things as private property diminishes the productivity of resources 
even though each fragment may still have some positive economic value.” Id. 
 46  See Merrill & Smith, supra note 2, at 20–23. 
47 34 N.E. 542 (Mass. 1893). 
 48  Id. at 542. 
 49  See id. 
 50  See Merrill & Smith, supra note 2, at 69.  Another widely cited example involves 
a testator attempting to leave a kind of “hybrid life estate,” involving a life estate with 
the power to transfer the property in fee simple.  See id. at 13.  Courts have been 
hostile to this, construing the property as either a life estate or a fee simple, but not a 
hybrid of both.  See, e.g., Smith v. Bell, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 68 (1832); Sumner v. Borders, 
98 S.W.2d 918 (Ky. 1936); St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Morton, 468 S.W.2d 193 (Mo. 
1971). 
 51  See Merrill & Smith, supra note 2, at 3–5.  According to Merrill and Smith, our 
courts do this sub silentio, without articulating or even acknowledging the numerus 
clausus doctrine.  See id. at 9.  Civil law countries are different in that they clearly 
recognize and label the numerus clausus doctrine, which is where Merrill and Smith 
get the name.  See id. at 4 (citing Bernard Rudden, Economic Theory v. Property Law: 
The Numerus Clausus Problem, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE: THIRD SERIES 239, 
241 (John Eekelaar & John Bell eds., 1987); KARL-HERMANN CAPELLE, BÜRGERLICHES 
RECHT: SACHENRECTH 13 (1963) (“Numerus Clausus, Typenzwang oder 
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they claim that new types of property create informational costs and 
burdens.52  This is so because of the in rem (as opposed to in 
personam) nature of property.53  Property rights are defined in the 
context of the thing, which is owned, as opposed to being defined in 
the context of the owners of the property.54  Accordingly, items of 
property must effectively communicate an owner’s rights and 
obligations to the world at large.55 
The problem with new types of property is that they make this 
communication process difficult and costly.56  “[T]hird parties have to 
expend time and resources to gain this knowledge, and unusual 
property forms increase the cost of doing this.”57  According to 
Merrill and Smith, it is this marginal informational cost that drives 
courts to apply the numerus clausus.58  By limiting new forms of 
 
Typenfixierung”); KLAUS SCHREIBER, SACHENRECTHT 28–29 (1993) (“Typenzwang und 
Typenfixierung”)); see also J. Michael Milo, Property and Real Rights, in ELGAR 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 587, 593–600 (Jan M. Smits ed., 2006); Roderick 
R.M. Paisley, Real Rights: Practical Problems and Dogmatic Rigidity, 9 EDINBURGH L. REV. 
267, 267 (2004).  But see infra note 63 (discussing this phenomenon in other, though 
related, terms). 
 52  See Merrill & Smith, supra note 2, at 39. 
 53  See Merrill & Smith, supra note 3, at 359.  
 54  This conflicts with the view of property rights as a “bundle of rights.”  Compare 
ADAM SMITH, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 9–86 (R.L. Meek et al. eds. 1978), and 
JEREMY BENTHAM, THE LIMITS OF JURISPRUDENCE DEFINED 164 (Charles Warren ed., 
1945), with Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RUTGERS L. REV. 357, 370 
(1954) (characterizing property as an “exclusive right to control an economic 
good”). 
 55  See Merrill & Smith, supra note 3, at 359.  “In order to avoid violating another’s 
property rights, [individuals] must ascertain what those rights are.  In order to 
acquire property rights, [individuals] must measure various attributes, ranging from 
the physical boundaries of a parcel, to use rights, to the attendant liabilities of the 
owner to others (such as adjacent owners).”  Merrill & Smith, supra note 2, at 26. 
 56  See Pomeroy, WPH, supra note 9, at 529.   
 57  Id.  Heterogeneity of property forms would create higher cost because it would 
require both the parties to a given transaction and third parties to process and 
understand additional information.  See Merrill & Smith, supra note 3, at 359; Merrill 
& Smith, supra note 2, at 26–27 (citing Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Unity 
of Property Rights 5–6 (Nov. 17, 1999) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the 
Yale Law Journal)).  Indeed, it is the costs borne by third parties that Merrill and 
Smith focus on.  They claim that property owners will not take account of these costs 
because they do not bear them.  See id. at 27.  Accordingly, property “works” only 
when it is simple and standardized enough that all third parties can understand the 
rights that flow from property easily and with little or no cost.  See id. at 28. 
 58  See Merrill & Smith, supra note 2, at 25–26 (relying upon Keppell v. Bailey, 
(1834) 39 Eng. Rep. 1042 (Ch.) 1049).  But see Henry Hansmann & Ugo Mattei, The 
Functions of Trust Law: A Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
434, 442 (1998) (casting some doubt on Merrill and Smith’s views of the numerus 
clausus doctrine as a coherent response to systemic costs by claiming that that the 
numerus clausus theory, as developed in civil law France, “was largely the product of 
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property, then, courts guard against the informational burdens that 
would proliferate if parties could create whatever property form they 
wanted to create.59  Of course, this limitation of freedom causes 
frustration to society because people cannot create whatever property 
form they would like and are instead forced to conform their affairs 
and actions to the relatively limited suite of property forms that 
courts acknowledge and permit.60 
These opposing forces drive property law toward what Merrill 
and Smith call “optimal standardization,” wherein the frustration 
costs and the information burden costs are balanced and so result in 
an “optimal” level of homogeneity.61  This can be represented in 
graphic format: 
 
the folklore and ideology of the French revolution and lacked a well articulated 
general rationale”). 
 59  This judicial limitation permits everyone “to limit his or her inquiry to 
whether the interest does or does not have the features of [pre-existing] forms.” 
Merrill & Smith, supra note 2, at 33.  “Perhaps the key point about the numerus 
clausus is informational: The forced standardization of property forms creates a kind 
of shorthand which, in turn, reduces information costs.”  Jonathan C. Lipson, Secrets 
and Liens: The End of Notice in Commercial Finance Law, 21 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 421, 
497 (2005).  This prevents everyone from “mistakenly mak[ing] inconsistent uses of 
the asset or underus[ing] the asset.”  Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 8, at 382.   
 60  See Merrill & Smith, supra note 2, at 35.  Another way to understand the 
numerus clausus doctrine is to again compare contract and property law.  See, e.g., 
Mulligan, supra note 8, at 237–38.  One of the most noticeable differences between 
the two is that contractual arrangements are highly customizable, while property 
arrangements are not.  See id.  This is because the default rules that govern contract 
law are generally alterable, whereas “a transfer of real or tangible property is 
forbidden unless the transfer is permitted by law and within one of ‘a limited 
number of standardized forms.’”  Id. at 238 (citations omitted).  When a court 
reviews a highly negotiated contract, it endeavors endlessly to divine the parties’ 
intent.  See Arthur L. Corbin, The Interpretation of Words and the Parol Evidence Rule, 50 
CORNELL L. REV. 161, 162 (1965).  But “[w]hen parties try to enforce property rights 
that lie outside of the recognized forms, courts shoe-horn those rights into one of 
the existing forms.”  Mulligan, supra note 8, at 238.  It is this built-in restriction on 
imaginative customization, so easily discerned when contrasted with contract law, 
which exemplifies the essence of the numerus clausus. 
 61  See Merrill & Smith, supra note 2, at 40.   
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“Here, the x-axis is the number of property forms allowed, the y-
axis is cost incurred by society, and the two cost curves measure the 
social cost caused by unfettered freedom and the frustration costs 
caused by limits on agency.”62  The numerus clausus, in theory, 
balances these curves and so creates the “optimal” number of 
property forms that minimize the overall costs experienced by society 
at large. 
This theory is, then, an excellent explanation for a relatively 
narrow area of the law (property form) that seems uniquely 
restrictive.63  The only problem is that, upon further examination, the 
numerus clausus is not a very persuasive explanation for property 
form heterogeneity. 
 
 62  Pomeroy, WPH, supra note 9, at 533.  This graph is derived from one created 
by Merrill and Smith, and I have utilized it in both SVD and WPH. 
 63  I have generally referred to the “numerus clausus” doctrine and have, more or 
less, entirely attributed it to Merrill and Smith.  I think that is fair, given the 
enormous amount of attention they have brought to this concept.  It is also 
reasonable, given that the thesis of this paper is that Merrill and Smith are, in 
essence, wrong.  It is worth mentioning, however, that theirs is not the only 
justification for the widely accepted idea that there is a “closed number” of property 
forms in the common law system.  Some believe that this minimization ensures the 
alienability of property.  See Carol M. Rose, What Government Can Do for Property (and 
Vice Versa), in THE FUNDAMENTAL INTERRELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND 
PROPERTY 209, 214–15 (Nicholas Mercuro & Warren J. Samels eds., 1999); Heller, 
supra note 45, at 1176–78.  Others claim that it arises from a need to facilitate the 
verification of ownership rights.  See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 8.  In truth, 
these three explanations are highly interconnected; however, throughout this paper, 
I shall primarily address the writings of Merrill and Smith. 
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2. Shortcomings of the Current Numerus Clausus Theory 
Like many commentators, I initially reacted very positively to the 
numerus clausus doctrine.64  The doctrine seemed to me to be a very 
cogent and helpful explanation of an interesting area of the law, and 
I began to consider very carefully what other applications it might 
have.  To begin with, in SVD, I argued that the numerus clausus 
should apply to vesting documents, which drive much of the logistics 
of property transfer.65 
I did this by focusing on the cost of vesting document 
heterogeneity and viewing these costs in the context of Merrill and 
Smith’s informational burden analysis.66  In brief, although the costs 
of heterogeneity are not possible to pinpoint precisely, they can be 
conceptualized.  The difficulty with allowing any sort of document to 
be recorded is that doing so may ultimately confuse interested parties 
who attempt to utilize the recording system to ascertain title and 
ownership information.67  In other words, “a wide range of potentially 
recordable documents negatively affects informational certainty.”68  
This cost, then, is the same type of informational burden Merrill and 
Smith described when looking at property form.69 
 
 64  See generally Pomeroy, WPH, supra note 9,; Pomeroy, SVD, supra note 9.  And 
there are many other examples of other positive reviews and commentaries on this 
iteration of the numerus clausus.  See, e.g., Sarah Harding, Perpetual Property, 61 FLA. L. 
REV. 285, 317 (2009) (discussing the “recent wave of articles on the numerus clausus 
principle”); Mulligan, supra note 8, at 235 (discussing numerus clausus and listing 
other articles doing the same).  
 65  See Pomeroy, SVD, supra note 9, at 992–93.  Vesting documents are those that 
pass title from one party to another.  See id. at 966 n.53 (citing MICH. COMP. LAWS § 
554.13 (2012); OHIO REV. CODE § 5302.171 (West 2011); Sintz v. Stone, 562 So.2d 228 
(Ala. 1990); Dixon v. Still, 121 A.2d 269 (D.C. 1956); Sun Valley Land & Minerals, 
Inc. v. Burt, 853 P.2d 607 (Idaho 1993); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1083 (abridged 6th 
ed. 1997)). 
 66  See Pomeroy, SVD, supra note 9, at 992–93.   
 67  See id. at 971.  This is, of course, inimical to the recording system, which exists 
primarily to communicate clear and concrete information.  See id. at 970.  Recording 
statutes ensure this clarity by incentivizing title claimants to file vesting documents so 
that later-interested parties can review all relevant vesting documents and thereby 
understand chain of title.  See id. (citing Dan S. Schechter, Judicial Lien Creditors Versus 
Prior Unrecorded Transferees of Real Property: Re-Thinking the Goals of the Recording System 
and Their Consequences, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 105, 109 (1988); Douglas G. Baird & Thomas 
H. Jackson, Possession and Ownership: An Examination of the Scope of Article 9, 35 STAN. L. 
REV. 175, 183 (1983)).   
 68  See Pomeroy, SVD, supra note 9 at 971.   
 69  See id. at 975.  This parallel here is not exact in that the exogenous costs 
identified by Merrill and Smith in the property form context probably do not apply 
to the vesting context.  See Pomeroy, WPH, supra note 9, at 530.  Exactitude is not 
necessary, however.  So long as there is theoretical pressure to eliminate 
heterogeneity, the same analysis should apply, even if a theoretically lower burden 
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As such, I reasoned, the same countervailing forces should be 
brought to bear in the vesting document context as have been 
brought to bear in the property form context.70  That is, courts should 
push back against new or unique types of vesting documents in the 
same way they have traditionally pushed back against inventive or 
“fancy” property forms.71  This would have the effect of seeking an 
“optimal” number of types of vesting documents.72  Additionally, I 
believed that the reasoning used to make that claim further validated 
the effectiveness of the numerus clausus doctrine as a powerful tool 
to understand property law generally. 
Flush from that conclusion, I began to wonder just what area of 
property law could not be viewed through the lens of the numerus 
clausus.  Ultimately, I concluded that the answer was none.  In WPH, 
then, I expanded the informational burden analysis of SVD, arguing 
that it should apply to all of property law.73  In other words, all areas 
of property law exhibit “a failure in the broadcast that systemically 
flows from property, creating difficulty both for the immediate 
parties concerned and for all parties, who must always be on the 
lookout for new, or different, rights that upset standardized 
calculations.”74 
The additional examples I used to make this point related to the 
areas of co-ownership, and third party property rights and the 
heterogeneity built into the American common and statutory law 
governing them.75  Heterogeneity in all of these distinct areas of 
property law creates confusion and makes it difficult for people to 
understand the rights that flow from property.76  And, returning to 
 
results in a theoretically more diverse optimum.  
 70  See Pomeroy, SVD, supra note 9, at 992–93.   
 71  See id. at 995.   
 72  See id. at 992–93 (citing Merrill & Smith, supra note 2, at 40). 
 73  See generally Pomeroy, WPH, supra note 9(arguing that the informational 
burdens that are key to Merrill and Smith’s theory, and the push for optimal 
simplification that arises therefrom, exist in all areas of property law).   
 74  Id. at 524 n.79. 
 75  See id. at 514–16. Co-ownership refers to the laws governing the concurrent 
ownership of property by more than one party, and third party property rights refers 
to the potential rights of non-owners to property, primarily arising in the creditor-
debtor context.   
 76  See id.  With respect to third party rights, consider the varying state laws 
regarding creditor rights in debtor property.  Creditors can seize debtor assets 
throughout the country, but the rules governing how they do so change from state to 
state.  See id. at 514–15 (citing numerous, differing state statutes regarding 
exemptions and differing case law regarding creditor rights in concurrent and 
marital property).  This means that creditors and prospective creditors cannot 
uniformly understand and assess the property rights and the potential risks and 
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Merrill and Smith, heterogeneity in these other areas creates the 
same kind of burden that the numerus clausus is supposed to be 
preventing in the context of property form.77  This is especially 
notable, given that the numerus clausus could seemingly apply to all 
areas of property law in the same way it has, according to Merrill and 
Smith, been applied to property form.78 
This, I now think, is a problem.  If the numerus clausus so nicely 
justifies homogeneity due to the problems and costs that arise from 
 
rewards inherent in the extension of credit, thereby affecting an enormous part of 
the economy.  See id. at 516  (pointing out that “more than $1.2 trillion of residential 
mortgages were extended to borrowers in 2011 alone”).  With respect to co-
ownership, there is widespread variability among different jurisdictions in that the 
states often treat the well-known, traditional suite of co-ownership interests 
differently in numerous ways.  See id. at 535 (citing Riddle v. Harmon, 162 Cal. Rptr. 
530 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (recognizing differing law as to existence of unities of title 
necessary to creation of joint tenancy)). Without a set of standard rules or laws, it is 
not possible for any party to know precisely what characteristics attach to a given 
property interest.   
 77  Take, for example, the area of third party property rights.  In this context, 
different states grant different rights in debtor property to creditors.  See, e.g., 
Pomeroy, WPH, supra note 9, at 515.  This means that creditors to a particular 
transaction must take extra care to fully understand their potential creditor property 
rights (i.e., their remedies).  It also means, however, that all creditors everywhere must 
take extra care every time they enter into, or evaluate entering into, a transaction.  
This is because the mere potential for uncertainty infects non-parties.  See Merrill & 
Smith, supra note 2, at 27 (citing Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 57, in 
discussing how permitting new, or “fanciful,” types of property interests in a watch 
would make all potential watch-buyers anxious about buying a non-uniform watch 
and would cause them to incur extra costs to guard against such an outcome).  This 
same sort of analogy can be made in any area of property law: heterogeneity that 
touches upon ownership rights will inevitably lead to increased cost, both with 
respect to the parties at issue and with respect to all third parties. 
 78  If the numerus clausus were applied to vesting heterogeneity, the many 
different kinds of vesting documents would be reduced and simplified, see Pomeroy, 
SVD, supra note 9, at 993; if it were applied to third party rights, all jurisdictions 
would be pushed toward a more standard set of exemptions and creditor rights, see 
Pomeroy, WPH, supra note 9, at 535–37; and, if it were applied to co-ownership, the 
conflicting laws associated with these property interests would narrow, see id.  Simply 
put, the variations from jurisdiction to jurisdiction would go away, leaving a 
smoother, more wholly “Americanized” property law.  See id. at 542.  See also S. ANIL 
KUMAR & N. SURESH, OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT 198 (2009) (tying together 
standardization and simplification).  This does not mean, of course, that all 
heterogeneity would disappear.  As indicated above, the numerus clausus does not 
impose a rigid sameness.  See supra note 62 and accompanying text.  Rather, it pushes 
the law toward an optimal point of homogeneity, wherein the informational costs of 
variety are balanced with the need for inventiveness.  See supra note 61 and 
accompanying text.  As described in WPH, “a widespread heterogeneity numerus 
clausus would take effect—on a case-by-case basis, continually evaluating new or 
different property rules to balance the extent to which such newness benefits the law 
with the extent to which that same newness harms the legal system.”  Pomeroy, WPH, 
supra note 9, at 537. 
POMEROY (DO NOT DELETE) 5/12/2014  1:33 PM 
814 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:797 
heterogeneity, why is it that only one area of property law is 
homogenous?  In WPH, I mostly passed over the issue, noting that it 
was a question for another day.79  Instead, I analyzed the legal 
system’s failure to change or adapt in an ongoing fashion, focusing 
on the extraordinary cost that changing settled property law would 
cause.80  I continue to believe that this is valid—property law, though 
fractured and often uncertain, is far too economically important to 
change in a retroactive manner.81  However, upon further reflection, I 
think the question of why the numerus clausus has not created 
blanket uniformity throughout property law is a fatal flaw belying the 
entire doctrine. 
Consider an analogy.  Suppose that there is a doctor in the early 
20th century, and a man comes to him complaining of headaches, 
nausea, and loss of appetite.  After a battery of tests and questions, 
the doctor diagnoses the man as having typhoid fever.82  Being a 
curious doctor, he delves deeper, attempting to discover the cause of 
this long-known but little-understood disease.  He asks questions 
about the patient’s family, job, diet, and living situation.  Eventually, 
after digging deeper, he focuses on the man’s diet.  Recently, the 
man cut most meat out of his diet, now eating primarily fruits and 
vegetables—food that he does not find appetizing.  The doctor 
 
 79  See Pomeroy, WPH, supra note 9, at 537–38 (“It is not entirely clear from the 
research set forth and examined here precisely why it is that the informational 
burdens associated with property form heterogeneity had a stabilizing influence, 
while those associated with other areas of property law have not had a similar 
influence,” but “this question is largely beyond the scope of this article.”).   
 80  See id. at 532.  In other words, rather than asking why the numerus clausus has 
not homogenized all of property law, I focused on why courts have not reacted to the 
doctrine, in reviewing new property law issues and in re-evaluating old precedent.  
See id.  This is a prospective question, ignoring the potential ex ante application of 
the numerus clausus that Merrill and Smith claim has occurred with respect to 
property form. 
 81  The example I gave in WPH concerned attempting to impose uniformity in a 
state (Nevada) that has historically permitted what is known as a grant, bargain, and 
sale deed (a “GBS deed”).  See Pomeroy, WPH, supra note 9, at 540.  This type of 
vesting document is unknown in many jurisdictions and so would conceivably have 
never been permitted had the first Nevada court with an opportunity disallowed it.  
See id.  That does not mean, however, that present courts should do so, as such an 
action would limit creativity (the kinds of costs traditionally associated with the 
numerus clausus) and create a host of present and future “roll-back” costs (like 
correcting future users and purging old documents).  See id. at 541.  All attempts to 
create uniformity would have similar costs.  Indeed, in the context of many areas of 
property law, these costs are likely structural and pronounced, given that our 
recording system cements into place past practices.  See id. 
 82  See Water, Sanitation and Hygiene, UNICEF, http://www.unicef.org/wash
/index_wes_related.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2014) (noting that symptoms of 
Typhoid fever “are characterized by headaches, nausea and loss of appetite”).  
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examines other patients with typhoid, and they all suffer from loss of 
appetite, as well.  As such, the doctor reaches a conclusion: typhoid 
fever is caused by eating unappetizing vegetables! 
Obviously, this conclusion is untrue.83  But let us reflect on the 
logic of the analytical process of our doctor and his conclusion.  It is 
true that typhoid typically causes loss of appetite and that, therefore, 
it is easy to associate loss of appetite with typhoid.84  However, there 
are many, many diseases that cause loss of appetite,85 and our 
hypothetical patient does not have any of those diseases, according to 
the doctor.  Our doctor, then, is painting with far too broad a brush.  
The consumption of unappetizing vegetables can be used to explain 
a whole host of diseases and seems equally convincing with respect to 
each of them, but it does not actually cause any of them. 
I think this is what Merrill and Smith have done.  They have 
selected a facially logical explanation for the homogeneity of the law 
governing property form and have therefore put that forth as the 
explanation.  What they have not considered (like our doctor did not 
consider) is that heterogeneity drives up costs in all areas of property 
law because the informational burdens (which drive Merrill and 
Smith’s numerus clausus construct) are present throughout property 
law, not just in the context of property form.  That this is so, despite 
the fact that the homogeneity that Merrill and Smith claim flows from 
those burdens is wholly absent in virtually every other area of 
property law, significantly weakens Merrill and Smith’s central 
thesis.86  It is not logically possible to tie together cause and effect if 
 
 83  See, e.g., The Real Cause of Typhoid Fever Accidentally Discovered, INSIDE SCIENCE 
(July 19, 2013), http://www.insidescience.org/content/real-cause-typhoid-fever-
accidentally-discovered/1212.  Typhoid Fever is caused by the bacterium Salmonella 
typhi, a pathogen that is often found in dirty water or contaminated food. 
 84  See, e.g., Typhoid Fever, WEBMD, http://www.webmd.com/a-to-z-
guides/typhoid-fever (last visited Jan. 31, 2014); Common Water and Sanitation Related 
Diseases, UNICEF, http://www.unicef.org/wash/index_wes_related.html (last visited 
Jan. 31, 2014). 
 85  See, e.g., Loss of Appetite, MEDICINENET.COM, http://www.medicinenet.com
/loss_of_appetite/symptoms.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2014) (indicating that loss of 
appetite can be a symptom of Addison’s disease, Amyloidosis, Cancer, Cat Scratch 
Disease—apparently a real malady, not just a terrible song—dementia, depression, 
kidney failure, postpartum depression, Rheumatoid Arthritis, stroke, and yellow 
fever, to name a few).   
 86  Consider just a single example.  “The numerus clausus principle is essentially 
nonexistent in intellectual property law.”  Mulligan, supra note 8, at 237–38.  See also 
Heller, supra note 46, at 1174–75 (discussing the failure of patent law to “prevent[] 
excessive fragmentation”).  This is so despite the presence of precisely the type of 
informational burdens identified by Merrill and Smith.  See Mulligan, supra note 8, at 
266 (describing, in terms of the difficulties of third parties in understanding and 
ordering rights, the confusion and costs caused by the differing types of licensing 
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the alleged cause exists in other contexts without an effect. 
This sort of error is, it seems, related to the “sharpshooter 
fallacy.”  This is a logical error in which one does not establish the 
conditions of a “test” until after the results are “proven.”  The classic 
example of this fallacy is of someone shooting a wall and then 
painting a target around the bullet hole, thereby “proving” a bullseye 
and establishing his shooting accuracy.87  Merrill and Smith did not 
do this in the classic sense.  That would involve establishing and 
describing the numerus clausus and then determining that it could 
be used to explain property form homogeneity.  Instead, I think they 
identified the “problem” of property form homogeneity,88 came up 
with the “solution” of the numerus clausus, and then fit the two 
together, concluding that the one explains (or causes) the other.  
Rather than shooting against a wall and painting a bullseye, I think 
this is more akin to shooting against a wall and hitting many different 
bullseyes—but only focusing on one of them and then using that one 
shot to establish accuracy. 
Instead of the sharpshooter fallacy, then, perhaps this sort of 
logical disconnect should be called the “shotgun fallacy.”  A shotgun 
generally uses a fixed shell to fire many smaller, spherical pellets 
called shot.  The shot sprays out, with the individual pellets hitting in 
different places and creating a much wider blast radius.  So, then, the 
pellets hit many “targets.”  However, that does not mean the shooter 
can point to a particular bullseye and claim that his good shooting 
caused the bullseye. 
Similarly, the numerus clausus ultimately sprays out over a wide 
swath of property law, as discussed above.89  It does “hit” property 
form, in the sense that heterogeneity would cause additional costs in 
this area of the law.  However, the numerus clausus also “hits” other 
areas of the law in precisely the same sense.90  As such—in the same 
way that our marksman cannot claim that his good shooting caused 
the bullseye or that our hypothetical doctor, above, cannot claim that 
 
rights extant in the American system of intellectual property law). 
 87  See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Makofski, 116 S.W.3d 176, 186 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003) 
(giving a basic explanation of this fallacy, apparently sometimes called the “Texas 
Sharpshooter Fallacy”).   
 88  As can be inferred from the discussion above, the “problem” of homogeneity, 
as originally faced by Merrill and Smith, was that it was unique and so required 
explanation.  See supra Part II.B.   
 89  That is, the burdens and costs that drive informational burden analysis at the 
heart of the numerus clausus doctrine all seem to be present in other areas of 
property law as well.  See supra Part II.B.   
 90  See id. 
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eating unappetizing vegetables causes typhoid fever—I do not think 
that one can claim that the numerus clausus causes, or is uniquely 
connected to, the homogeneity of property form.  The context here 
is slightly different, but the principle is apt: the numerus clausus, 
which seems equally applicable to all areas of property law, cannot 
serve as an explanation for something that manifests itself in just one, 
specific area of property law.  In the end, the differing levels of 
homogeneity present in property form and the other areas of 
property law, despite the similar informational burdens inherent in 
all of property law, undercuts the use of the numerus clausus as a 
reasonable, logical explanation of the sort urged by Merrill and 
Smith. 
To be fair, Merrill and Smith could still be correct if it were 
demonstrated that property form heterogeneity fosters informational 
burdens, if not uniquely, then in a different manner, or to a higher 
degree, than it does in other areas of property law.91  However, there 
is no real reason to think that this is so.  As discussed above, Merrill 
and Smith do a very nice job of describing the numerus clausus and 
of explaining the costs that arise from heterogeneity in that context.92  
But that description and that explanation seem to be just as 
applicable in virtually every other area of property law.93 Indeed, the 
argument above regarding the theoretically widespread presence of 
heterogeneity-induced informational burdens in all of property law 
appears to be uniform in all particulars. In other words, conceptually, 
there is some reason to think that heterogeneity necessarily creates 
cost in every area of property law. 
To understand this, return again to the basic purpose of 
property: encompassing and conveying rights.94  It is, to once more 
use Merrill and Smith’s term, a way to “broadcast” information about 
legally cognizable rights and obligations.95  This purpose holds true 
for all aspects of property.  All of the different facets of property law96 
combine to define what we “own” and what that means.  Accordingly, 
confusion over any one of these areas creates confusion throughout 
 
 91  See Pomeroy, WPH, supra note 9, at 524 n.79. 
 92  See id.   
 93  See id.   
 94  Property law defines ownership rights in property.  See Rose, supra note 31, at 
577 (indicating that much of property is constituted of rules that “signal to all of us, 
in a clear and distinct language, precisely what our obligations are and how we may 
take care of our interests”). 
 95  See supra note 73 and accompanying text.  
 96  See, e.g., Pomeroy, WPH, supra note 9, at 510 (setting forth a taxonomy that 
dissects property into its component pieces).   
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all systems that interpret and rely upon property principals—that is, 
confusion (created by heterogeneity) increases the costs for all 
participants and potential participants.  This is precisely what 
troubled Merrill and Smith in contemplating property form 
heterogeneity;97 but, again, it exists everywhere in property, and in 
equal measure. 
In the end, then, it appears that the numerus clausus, fashioned 
by Merrill and Smith as a remedy to informational overload that is 
uniquely applicable to property form, is a misdiagnosis and does not 
withstand theoretical scrutiny.98  In essence, “an argument that 
explains everything, explains nothing.”99  Of course, that raises the 
obvious question of what does really explain the unique homogeneity 
of property form.  I address this question in Part III, below, and come 
 
 97  See supra note 57 and accompanying text.  
 98  Also casting Merrill and Smith’s hypothesis into doubt is the fact that a 
number of the cases cited by them in support of their diagnosis of a sub silentio 
numerus clausus seem not to bear closer scrutiny.  See, e.g., Sumner v. Borders, 98 
S.W.2d 918 (Ky. Ct. App. 1936) (cited in Merrill & Smith, supra note 2, at 14 n.44); 
Thompson v. Baxter, 119 N.W. 797 (Minn. 1909) (cited in Merrill & Smith, supra 
note 2, at 22 n.87); Garner v. Gerrish, 473 N.E.2d 223 (N.Y. 1984) (cited in Merrill & 
Smith, supra note 2, at 22 n.88); Smith’s Transfer & Storage Co. v. Hawkins, 50 A.2d 
267 (D.C. 1946) (cited in Merrill & Smith, supra note 2, at 11–12 n.28).  Three of 
these cases are lease cases, and they all ultimately permit the creation of a lease that 
is neither a traditional term of years nor a traditional tenancy at will.  See Thompson, 
119 N.W. at 799 (permitting the creation of a life estate terminable upon the lessee’s 
moving away from the locale of the leased property); Smith’s Transfer, 50 A.2d at 268 
(construing a lease as creating a term for one year, unless World War II had not 
terminated at that time, in which case the lease shall continue until that war 
terminated “by proclamation of the President of the United States, or by joint 
resolution of Congress of the United States”); Garner, 473 N.E.2d at 225 (interpreting 
a lease term dependent on one party’s discretion as a “determinable life tenancy”).  
Indeed, Thompson cites a number of additional cases permitting determinable 
leasehold life estates.  See Thompson, 119 N.W. at 799 (citing, among others, Hurd v. 
Cushing, 24 Mass. 169 (1828), which permitted a lease for “so long as the salt works 
located thereon should continue in operation” and Warner v. Tanner, 38 Ohio St. 118 
(1882), which permitted a lease for yearly rent so long as the lessee should continue 
to occupy the premises for a particular purpose).  And the first case mentioned 
above, Sumner v. Borders, actually turns upon a local statute.  See Sumner, 98 S.W.2d at 
919.  It is true, then, that the Kentucky Court of Appeals turned a seemingly “fancy” 
interest into a fee simple.  See id.  However, it did so not due to any concern out of 
informational burdens, but rather at the direction of the state legislature.  See id.  
That this distinction is quite relevant will become apparent later on in this Article.  
See infra Part III. 
 99  See Ronald J. Allen & Brian Leiter, Naturalized Epistemology and the Law of 
Evidence, 87 VA. L. REV. 1491, 1527 (2001).  Though not credited in the foregoing 
article, this quote is often attributed to Karl Popper, an Austro-British philosopher 
and professor at the London School of Economics, as a description of the 
sharpshooter fallacy.  I believe the logic inherent in the statement is my self-styled 
“shotgun fallacy.”  
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to a much earthier, though admittedly less elegant, conclusion than 
Merrill and Smith. 
III. THE HISTORY OF PROPERTY 
“He who controls the past controls the future.”100 
Rather than seeking the key to our eclectic property laws from a 
clever articulation of economic ideals,101 we should look instead to 
historic England and to the motivations and circumstances that 
influenced the English monarchy and nobility as they engaged in a 
series of skirmishes that ultimately shaped modern property law.  In 
particular, we need to examine a couple of critical statutes passed in 
the thirteenth century, which ultimately had an outsized effect on our 
concept of estates and property form.  In reviewing this important 
part of our common law history, we should be mindful of the 
underlying motivations of the parties in power who created these 
laws.  We should keep these motivations in mind, first, because it aids 
in our understanding of just how it is that these ancient decisions 
fundamentally changed property law, and, second, because those 
underlying motivations are with us to this day and reverberate 
through our modern laws and circumstances. 
To begin, let us stipulate that most affairs of collective human 
activity are founded upon contests for money and power102 and 
examine how property has been shaped in that context.  Not 
surprisingly, given this discussion, an analysis of the history of our 
laws reveals the omnipresent desire of those who craft these laws for 
money and power.  The interplay of these desires and competing 
concerns, over the centuries, manifested itself in a series of 
competing, evolving statutes and laws in early English common law.  
It is the nature of these statutes, and the interests underlying them, 
which really explains what has happened to property.103  Indeed, the 
 
 100  GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 178 (Good Book Classics, 2013) (memorably quoted by 
Rage Against the Machine in Testify, 1999).   
 101  Again, I wish to give credit to Merrill and Smith’s theory.  I think it is an 
elegant one, and I think it has very much stoked an interest in a really interesting 
area of property law.  Ultimately, however, I do not think it is applicable in the way 
Merrill and Smith contend. 
 102  There is, of course, no real footnote that can support this subjective claim.  I 
think it well within the realm of reasonability, however, given an even cursory review 
of human history.  Laws, wars, migrations, discovery—virtually any important 
historical element of human activity can be credibly ascribed to humanity’s thirst for 
money and power.   
 103  Given the focus of this paper, this historical analysis is intended to explain the 
unique homogeneity of property form against the backdrop of property’s generally 
heterogeneous nature.  Additionally, it is worth noting that this analysis is not 
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very nature of our system of estates—from which ultimately springs 
the unique homogeneity of property form—arises from the contest 
for wealth and influence. 
To understand the relevant history, one must begin with the 
concepts of feudal incidents.  Conceptually, all land belonged to the 
king and was granted from him to his lords in exchange for “feudal 
incidents.”104  These lords could, in turn, transfer the land to others in 
exchange for their own feudal incidents.  These incidents varied a 
great deal.105  However, at their base, they benefited the king (or 
overlord) at the expense of the inferior landowner and can thus be 
viewed, broadly, as a tax.106  One of the earliest contests over land, 
power, and wealth, then, involved the struggle between the king and 
the nobility over these incidents.  And one of the earliest rules serving 
 
intended to be an exhaustive history of English statutes, even as they might relate to 
the topic at hand.  There are almost certainly additional statutes, aside from the ones 
discussed momentarily, that would relevant here.  Nevertheless, I believe that these 
statutes serve as an adequate basis to broach, and establish, my hypothesis that 
property homogeneity is more appropriately attributed to a historical review of 
English common law than to Merrill and Smith’s informational burden analysis. 
 104  “After the Battle of Hastings, William declared himself the owner of all land in 
England.  Rather than award outright ownership of land to his supporters, 
William . . . kept some strings attached to the land.”  Roy T. Black, The Historical 
Background of some Modern Real Estate Principles, 34 REAL EST. L. J. 327, 334 (2005).  
“[T]he landholders essentially became tenants holding in service of the king.”  Id.  
“The landholding lords owed different forms of rent, known as feudal incidents . . . .”  
Id.  The feudal incidents can also be viewed as taxes.  See infra note 106.  This practice 
instituted by William caused land to be held by a relatively small class of wealthy 
individuals.  See H.R. LYON, ANGLO-SAXON ENGLAND AND THE NORMAN CONQUEST 327–
28 (2d ed. 1991) (“By 1086 when the Domesday census was taken there were only two 
English tenants-in-chief of baronial rank out of approximately 180 in the whole of 
England.”). 
 105  See James M. McElfish, Jr., Property Rights and Wetlands Regulation, SA83 ALI-
ABA 439, n.54 (1996) (“The free tenures were: tenure by knight service (requiring 
military service and the feudal incidents and aids); serjeanty (requiring personal 
service to the lord); frankalmoin (involving lands granted to religious establishments 
who were then obliged to say masses or prayers); and free and common socage (fixed 
rental of lands).”); B.H. McPherson, Revisiting the Manor of East Greenwich, 42 AM. J. 
LEGAL HIST. 35, 39 (1998) (“The number and character of incidents varied with the 
nature of the tenure.”).  Eventually, the practical application of this variation 
disappeared, as most of these incidents were commuted to simple monetary 
payments.  See Mark A. Senn, Shakespeare and the Land Law in his Life and Works, 48 
REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 111 (2013). 
 106  See David J. Seipp, Trust and Fiduciary Duty in the Early Common Law, 91 B.U. L. 
REV. 1011, 1015 (2011) (“These feudal incidents . . . of wardship and marriage can 
be viewed as a tax.”); Stewart E. Sterk, Asset Protection Trusts: Trust Law’s Race to the 
Bottom, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1035, 1041 (2000) (“The Statute of Uses, enacted in 1535, 
eliminated the use as a tax avoidance device and restored the king’s power to collect 
feudal incidents.”); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Abandon, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 
355, 399 (2010) (“Real property taxes are the modern-day equivalent of feudal 
incidents.”).  
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the king’s interest in this struggle was the rule of primogeniture.107  
Under this system of inheritance, ownership of property passed from 
father to eldest son, leaving other children and third parties with very 
little or nothing.108  This served the interests of the king because it 
limited the total number of landowners in the feudal system.109  The 
king, and his underling overlords, desired this because division and 
fragmentation of land could affect, and sometimes reduce, the 
incidents and relief flowing to the overlords and, ultimately, the 
king.110  Of course, in this, the king’s interest was directly opposed to 
those of the landowners, who would have liked to elude incidents and 
who also thereby lost any ability to transfer and control their land, the 
principal form of wealth.111 
Inevitably, various landowners, seeking control of “their” 
property, violated the rule of primogeniture.112  This, in turn, led the 
king and the overlords (and, more generically, any ancestors desiring 
to exercise control from beyond the grave) to create the fee tail.113  
This estate, generally created by words to the effect of “To X and the 
heirs of his body,” was meant to grant the land to A for life and to his 
eldest son upon survival, and to repeat that process ad infinitum.114  
Eventually, the courts became involved, exercising a strongly anti-
alienation115 prerogative and permitting the grantees of fee tails to 
 
 107  See Meggie Orgain, Death Comes to Us All, but Through Inheritance, the Rich can get 
Richer: Inheritance and the Federal Estate Tax, 4 EST. PLAN. & CMTY. PROP. L.J. 173, 175 
(2011).   
 108  See id. at 175 (2011); see also Christine G. Clark, Women’s Rights in Early England, 
1995 B.Y.U. L. REV. 207, 226–30 (discussing the effect of this practice on women). 
 109  See Pamela Champine, Expertise and Instinct in the Assessment of Testamentary 
Capacity, 51 VILL. L. REV. 25, 64 (2006); see also II POLLOCK & MAITLAND, THE HISTORY 
OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 362 (2d ed. 1905) (“Primogeniture 
reflects not family interest but rather the interests of a stranger to the inheritance—
some king or lord whose interests demand that the land shall not be partitioned . . . .  
The great fief, which is both property and office must, if it be inherited at all, 
descend as an integral whole.”). 
 110  See William A. Reppy, Jr., Judicial Overkill in Applying the Rule in Shelley’s Case, 73 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 83, 129–35 (1997); see also Stephen W. DeVine, Ecclesiastical 
Antecedents to Secular Jurisdiction Over the Feoffment to the Uses to Be Declared in 
Testamentary Instruments, 30 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 295, 295 (1986).   
 111  See Champine, supra note 109, at 64.   
 112  See Marianne M. Jennings, Real Property Could Use Some Updating, 24 REAL EST. 
L.J. 103, 106 (1995).  
 113  See Thomas C. Martin, Haunted by History: Colonial Land Trusts Pose National 
Threat, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 303, 312 n.59 (2006) (“The term ‘fee tail’ comes from 
the early modern English doctrine of entail, which arose out of the principle of 
primogeniture.”). 
 114  See Kent D. Schenkel, Exposing the Hocus Pocus of Trust, 45 AKRON L. REV. 63, 
101 (2012).   
 115  English courts have long favored the free alienation of property interests.  See 
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avoid this sort of limitation.116  The back and forth involving the king 
and other landholders (the tax recipients), the inferior landholders 
(the taxpayers), and the courts continued when, in 1285, the 
legislature passed a statute called the De Donis Conditionalibus.117  This 
statute seemed to cement into place a victory for the tax recipients by 
eliminating the fee simple conditional and legitimizing the fee tail.118  
However, in a response that is not surprising in hindsight, the courts 
again responded by creating the concept of “disentailing,” which 
essentially permitted the tenant in tail to convert their interest into a 
fee simple absolute.119 
So the contestants went back and forth, everyone trying, like 
Agamemnon in our story above, to establish their base of power and 
revenue.  More to the point, however, this back and forth began to 
shape our concept of property.  Indeed, the very concept of an 
“estate” as a legal metric of ownership can largely be traced to this 
struggle and, more specifically, to the De Donis Conditionalibus.120 
As a result of De Donis . . . the medieval lawyers recognized 
that an entailed fee was somewhat less than a fee simple and 
that the quantum of an estate had to be measured by its 
possible duration in time.  Reversioners and remaindermen 
became holders of existing interests as opposed to holders 
of rights to obtain an interest when the scope of the real 
actions expanded.  This recognition led to the conclusion 
 
Jessica L. Lacey, The Dead Hand Loses Its Grip in Virginia: A New Rule for Trust 
Amendment and Termination?, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 1235, 1240 (1995). 
 116  The courts relied on what is known the fee simple conditional to accomplish 
this.  This estate becomes a fee upon the occurrence of some condition—in this case, 
the birth of issue.  See John G. Shively, The Death of the Life in Being: The Required 
Federal Response to State Abolition of the Rule Against Perpetuities, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 371, 
374 (2000); see also Jennings, supra note 112, 106 (“[W]hen the judges read ‘To A 
and the heirs of his body,’ they said, ‘Looks like a fee simple conditional to me.  
Once A has heirs, he can do anything he wants with the land, including giving it to a 
[third party].’” (footnotes omitted)). 
 117  See Jennings, supra note 112, at 106.  
 118  See id. at 106–08.  Thereafter, the language, “To A and the heirs of his body,” 
clearly referred to the grantor’s lineal descendants.  See id. at 107.  As such, instead of 
the estate ultimately vesting in the grantee (as under the fee simple conditional 
construction), the grantor indefinitely retained a reversion for so long as the 
possibility existed that the line of natural descendants might expire.  See David A. 
Thomas, Anglo-American Land Law: Diverging Developments from a Shared History; Part I: 
Shared History, 34 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 143, 176 (1999). 
 119  See W. Barton Leach, Perpetuities in a Nutshell, 51 HARV. L. REV. 638, 663 (1938) 
(“[T]he power to disentail makes the tenant in tail the substantial owner and causes 
interests after the estate tail to be in substance gifts by the last tenant in tail at the 
time of expiration of his estate.”). 
 120  See Mark A. Senn, English Life and Law in the Time of the Black Death, 38 REAL 
PROP. PROB. & TRUST J. 507, 519 (2003).  
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that a fee simple could be comprised of several interests or 
estates.  In this sense, the root of estate (L. status, or 
standing or position), shows that an estate existed in 
relation to other possible interests.121 
Of course, the back and forth detailed above did not stand 
alone.  Also implicated in this early fashioning of estates was the 
Statute Quia Emptores.  This statute, not surprisingly, resulted from the 
partial victory of the king and his taxing cohortrepresented by the De 
Donis Conditionalibus. 
When tenants lost some of their ownership rights, under the De 
Donis Conditionalibis, they turned to other means to exploit their 
property.122  To understand what occurred, recall that, at its base, all 
property in Norman England belonged to the king and was “rented” 
out to his followers in exchange for different forms of “rent” or 
“taxes” in the form of feudal incidents.123  Those followers also 
desired to turn the land into rent.  As such, after receiving the use of 
the land from the king, they granted an estate in the land to a 
subordinate in exchange for their own feudal incidents.124  This 
process created “a pyramidal land holding structure with the king at 
the top of the pyramid and layers of landholders below him down to 
lowly serfs, who were in essence sharecroppers, paying their land rent 
with agricultural products.”125  So this process, called 
subinfeudation,126 permitted the landowners who had lost out under 
De Donis Conditionalibis to raise funds without violating primogeniture 
or fee tail restrictions by recruiting subordinate holders to pay feudal 
incidents.127 
The process of subinfeudation, however, was not a 
 
 121  Id. (footnotes omitted); see also C.M.A. McCauliff, The Medieval Origin of the 
Doctrine of Estates in Land: Substantive Property Law, Family Considerations and the Interests 
of Women, 66 TUL. L. REV. 919, 981–82 (1992) (“De Donis has largely been credited 
with establishing the doctrine of estates . . . [because] the avowed intention of this 
Act was simply to establish uniform rules for the regulation of conditional fees, but 
its effect was to create a form of estate of inheritance unknown to common law.”). 
 122  “Exploit,” here, is used in a strict sense and is not pejorative.  It merely means 
“to make productive use of.”  See Exploit, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/shape (last visited Feb. 2, 2014). 
 123  See supra note 104 and accompanying text.   
 124  See Black, supra note 104, at 337 (“The barons in turn granted the use of lands 
to knights who owed incidents to the barons.”).  This granting of an estate is also 
known as “enfeoffment.”  See Senn, supra note 120, at 557. 
 125  See Black, supra note 104.   
 126  “Subinfeudation” is sometimes referred to as “subinfeudination,” though the 
two terms appear to possess the same meaning.   
 127  See Julia Belian, Medicaid, Elective Shares, and the Ghosts of Tenures Past, 38 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 1111, 1146 (2005).  
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straightforward one.  Let us take for example a situation wherein the 
king grants an estate in land to A.  As we have discussed, A owes 
feudal incidents to the king, and A can subinfeudate by granting an 
estate in the land to B in exchange for B’s promise to pay future 
feudal incidents.  The problem with subinfeudation, from the king’s 
perspective, was that B (the newly enfeoffed tenant) was not required 
to pay feudal incidents directly to the king.128  Instead B paid his129 
incidents directly to A, who now became an overlord himself.130  Of 
course, A was still required to pay his incidents to the king.131  A often 
had difficulty doing so, however, because overlords in A’s position 
regularly reduced the kinds of incidents requested from grantees like 
B in order to increase the initial purchase price.132 
As such, in keeping with our recurring theme of parties seeking 
economic advantage through legislative action, the king (and 
overlords who similarly suffered due to subinfeudation) sought to 
block such transfers by statute.  This effort culminated in the Statute 
Quia Emptores, passed in 1290.133  Under this statute, subinfeudation 
(and its accompanying devaluation of feudal incidents) was 
prohibited, but lords were required to accept substitution134 upon the 
payment of a fee.135  This prohibition of subinfeudation significantly 
simplified the newly conceived system of estates by eliminating the 
very existence of a whole category of property claims.136 
 
 128  See Senn, supra note 120, at 556–57 (discussing the differences between 
substitution and subinfeudation).   
 129  And, due to primogeniture and other Norman traditions, it was always a “he.”  
See generally Clark, supra note 108, at 226–30. 
 130  See Senn, supra note 120, at 557.   
 131  See id. at 557.  In this, subinfeudation is different from substitution.  “By 
substitution, the tenant stepped out of the feudal hierarchy and the grantee replaced 
him.  The grantee then owed the lord whatever services and incidents his grantor 
had owed.”  Id. at 556.   
 132  See id. at 557.  So, for example, A may be required to provide the king with ten 
knights per year, while B may only be required to pay A “a peppercorn” each year.  
See, e.g., id.  This economically negative effect of subfeudation was compounded, 
from the king’s perspective, because the insertion of B into the chain of ownership 
prevented the property from escheating to the king upon A’s death, and all the king 
ended up with then was a tenant (B) who pays a peppercorn each year.  See id. at 557 
n.398 (“The seignory (i.e., the tenant’s right to the peppercorn) reverts; the land 
does not.”). 
 133  See David A. Super, A New New Property, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1773, 1856 (2013); 
Belian, supra note 127, at 1146.  
 134  See supra text accompanying note 131 (discussing substitution).  
 135  See Belian, supra note 127, at 1146.  
 136  See Michael A. de Gennaro, The “Public Trust” Servitude: Creating a Policy-Based 
Paradigm for Copyright Dispute Resolution and Enforcement, 37 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1131, 
1139 (2005) (indicating that subinfeudation created “many layers of competing 
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What we see occurring here is that the historical contest between 
taxpayers and tax recipients created the foundations of our property 
system; established the very nature of the property forms over which I 
have spilled so much ink; and immediately began to cabin the 
number of acceptable property forms. 
This limitation occurred naturally and implicitly as a result of 
the categorical nature of the De Donis Conditionalibis137 and more 
explicitly as a result of the Statute Quia Emptores’s bright line 
elimination of various kinds of interests.  This history, then, created 
our fixed concept of ownership as a system of estates; and once that 
structure was initially populated, innovation largely ceased.138 
That is not to say that all attempts at customization ceased.  The 
contest over money and power is never-ending, and the struggle 
between those seeking taxes and those seeking to avoid them will 
never end.  Take, for instance, the Statute of Uses.  Though the 
system of estates and the generally recognized suite of property forms 
were largely finalized after 1300, landowners discovered a way to 
avoid the payment of feudal incidents “by conveying land to one 
party ‘for the use’ of another.”139  This conveyance, ancestor to the 
 
interests”).  
 137  Once a concept like an “estate” is created, it must be classified.  Here, estates 
were quickly broken into either “estates in possession or estates in expectancy.”  See 
Senn, supra note 120, at 519–20 (“Estates in possession included the fee simple, 
which was the largest estate and descended to lineal and collateral heirs, the fee tail, 
which descended only to lineal heirs, and the life estate.  The estates in expectancy 
were the interests left over when the grantor gave less than all he owned: a reversion 
if the interest returned to him, and a remainder if it went to someone else.”).   
Categorization is, in and of itself, a limiting force and once bright lines are drawn 
around something, any innovation or exercise of creativity becomes a departure 
from the accepted.  This has an effect on people and on customs—instead of 
continually improvising, trying to improve, and adapting to new circumstances, 
people instead view the world through the lens of custom and, at least, hesitate to 
step outside the norm.  That is what occurred here, in the context of estates and 
property form. 
 138  McCauliff, supra note 121, at 983: 
[I]nterests in land were virtually fixed by De Donis. [A]fter De Donis, new 
types of interests in land were for the most part not created. . . . The 
interests in land were the fee simple, the fee tail, and the life estate, 
with the possibility of a remainder or reversion in estates in tail or for 
life. 
Id; see also Percy Bordwell, The Common Law Scheme of Estates, 18 IOWA L. REV. 425, 427 
(1933) (“[T]he old categories remained except as affected by the Statutes De Donis 
and Quia Emptores, and probably will remain substantially unchanged as long as the 
common law system of estates continues.”); Belian, supra note 127, at 1146 (“By 1300 
or so, this push and pull had flattened the feudal pyramid and frozen the estates as 
they stood.”). 
 139  See Thomas, supra note 118, at 178.  
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modern trust, avoided feudal incidents of tenancy by separating legal 
title from beneficial (or equitable) title.140  In response to the growth 
of this custom and the eventual atrophy of feudal incidents, “[Henry 
VIII] forced through the Statute of Uses (1536), designed primarily 
to prevent evasions of these incidents, and set up the Court of Wards 
and Liveries to collect them.”141  This “desperate attempt” by the king 
to restore feudal revenues worked, effectively cutting off the use as an 
effective tax avoidance scheme.142  More relevant to us, though, is that 
this serves as yet another example of how economic concerns drive 
legislation, which, in turn, drives the shape of our property system.  
In the case of the Statute of Uses, Henry VIII’s need for revenue led 
him to pass a statute that significantly changed the nature of property 
interests that had existed up to that time.143 
The lesson to take from this, then, is that property law, generally, 
and property form, particularly, has been shaped by historical 
economic concerns.  The De Donis Conditionalibis, the Statute Quia 
Emptores, and the Statute of Uses all affected our property forms—
establishing the concept of estates, narrowing the types of estates, and 
ultimately affecting the kinds of legal interests permitted within our 
system—and all of these statutes arose from the interplay between 
citizen and government over taxes.144  These historical forces are what 
 
 140  See R. H. Helmholz, The Early Enforcement of Uses, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1503, 1503 
(1979); W. Ives, The Genesis of the Statute of Uses, 82 ENG. HIST. REV. 673, 674 (1967); 
Payson R. Peabody, Taming CERCLA: A Proposal to Resolve the Trustee “Owner” Liability 
Quandary, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 405, 432 (1994); Claude Treece, The ERA and Texas 
Marital Law, 54 TEX. L. REV. 590, 610 (1976).  
 141  JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 190 (7th ed. 2010). 
 142  See Percy Bordwell, Seisen and Disseisin, 34 HARV. L. REV. 592, 597–98 (1921).  
See also Max Gibbons, Of Windfalls and Property Rights: Palazzolo and the Regulatory 
Takings Notice Debate, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1259, 1276 n.104 (2003) (“The Statute was the 
brainchild of King Henry VIII, who was running out of money and needed to 
concoct a system whereby landowners were unable to escape the feudal incidents 
owed to the Crown.”).  The Statute of Uses also greatly affected our system of 
conveyancing by permitting the transfer of real property by documents, see id., thus 
bringing into “almost universal use modes of alienation that did not require the 
symbolic ceremony [of feoffment].”  Joyce Palomar, History of the United States’ System 
of Conveyancing, PATTON AND PALOMAR ON LAND TITLES § 3 (2012). 
 143  See Jeffrey Evans Stake, Evolution of Rules in a Common Law System: Differential 
Litigation of the Fee Tail and Other Perpetuities, 32 FLA. ST. U.  L. REV. 401, 417 (2005) 
(“[In 1536, the Statute of Uses] executed ‘uses,’ beneficial interests recognized in 
equity, making them into legal interests.  Because it was possible to create many sorts 
of interests in equity that did not previously exist at law, the Statute of Uses made it 
possible for donors to create new legal interests.”); Gibbons, supra note 142, at 1276 
(“In 1536 the Statute of Uses was passed in England, the major effect of which was to 
convert equitable estates (uses) into legal estates by operation of law.”). 
 144  The argument that historical forces have shaped property, rather than an 
inherent informational cost-benefit analysis, is further supported by the types of 
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have shaped property, not something as ephemeral as the numerus 
clausus doctrine.145 
The echoes of these forces are with us still.  The property laws of 
England continue to affect American jurisdictions to this day.146  And 
the struggle between tax recipients and taxpayers continues as well.147  
 
property that have faded into disuse.  “In Blackstone’s time, the numerus clausus was 
much more numerous, populated with incorporeal hereditaments such as corodies 
and advowdsons that no longer exist.  Over time, these forms were pared down to the 
streamlined list that exists today.”  See Heller, supra note 46, at 1176 n.62.  See also 
Nestor M. Davidson, Standardization and Pluralism in Property Law, 61 Vand. L. Rev. 
1597, 1610–11 (2008) (discussing a number of historical property forms that have 
been eliminated).  Interestingly, these property forms were eliminated in and 
around the 14th Century, the timeframe immediately following the De Donis 
Conditionalibis and the Statute Quia Emptores.  See Dictionary of the English Church, 
Ancient and Modern 158 (T. Moore 1881) (“By I Edward III. stat. 2, cap. 10, it was 
enacted that there shall be no more grants of corodies at the king’s request by 
bishops, abbots, &c.”).  That these varied or heterogeneous property types were 
excluded at just this point in history seems to support the idea that it was really the 
need for taxes that created property form homogeneity. 
 145  These historical forces explain the homogeneity of property form, but they do 
not explain why the rest of property law is so varied (unlike other areas of law).  This 
heterogeneity may be attributable to the fixed nature of real property and the 
parochial interests that arise and attach to land in that context.   
Obviously, land does not move—it is forever tied to a single 
jurisdiction.  This inability to enter any sort of stream of commerce or 
to seek out any other laws or rules may remove any incentive any 
jurisdiction has to accommodate other views or to evolve or attempt to 
reach any useful consensus.   
Pomeroy, WPH, supra note 9, at 517.  It may be that American jurisprudence, having 
taken property form as an established part of the background of property 
jurisprudence, immediately began to fracture across jurisdictional lines. 
 146  See David A. Thomas, Anglo-American Land Law: Diverging Developments from a 
Shared History: Part III: British and American Real Property Law and Practice—A 
Contemporary Comparison, 34 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 443, 516 (1999) (“Almost every 
American state has by constitution or statute ‘received’ the English common law as 
the rule of decision in its courts, unless a contrary law or condition prevails in that 
state.  The result is that, today, in real property matters, the common law of England 
plays a much more important role in America than in England.”); see, e.g., Van 
Rensselaer v. Hays, 19 N.Y. 68, 74 (N.Y. 1859) (“[I] am of opinion that the law 
forbidding the creating of new tenants by means of subinfeudation was always the law 
of the Colony, and that it was the law of this State, as well before as after the passage 
of our act concerning tenures, in 1787.”). 
 147  There are many, many ways in which local states and jurisdictions profit from 
property.  These include, without limitation, property transfer taxes, see, e.g., 
Mushfique Shams Billah, Arab Money: Why isn’t the United States Getting Any?, 32 U. PA. 
J. INT’L L. 1055, 1087 (2011); stamp taxes, see Bradley T. Borden & Mathews 
Vattamala, Series LLCs in Real Estate Transactions, 46 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 255, 
258 (2011); and, of course property taxes, see J. Lyn Entrikin, Tax Ferrets, Tax 
Consultants, Bounty Hunters, and Hired Guns: The Property Tax Netherworld Fueled by 
Contingency Fees and Champertous Agreements, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 289, 289 (2014).  
Indeed, state and local governments collected nearly $478 billion in property taxes in 
the year ending on March 31, 2013.  See Entrikin, supra at 289.  This represents “more 
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Accordingly, all of the pressures discussed above in the context of 
“ancient” England remain with us today.  Governments still want to 
control the type and form of property to ensure that their revenues 
remain consistent, and so they continue to rely on the rules and 
structures created by the old laws and statutes of England.  As such, 
the present shape of history is unavoidably affected by its history and 
by the economic forces that have surrounded property for hundreds 
of years.  Property’s unique role as a source of revenue, then, is the 
more likely explanation for the homogeneity present in the area of 
property form.  Compounding and strengthening this influence is 
the fact that property—unlike torts, contracts, and other areas of 
law—is of infinite duration. 
 
By virtue of its durability, land invites an intricate layering 
of rights over time.  Lawyers have never bothered to create 
an elaborate doctrine of, say “estates in automobiles” or 
“covenants running with automobiles”; nor have they done 
so with any other non-landed property.  That is because 
after only a limited number of years, any given automobile 
will end in the junk heap.  This finite lifespan keeps 
encumbrances on automobiles relatively simple and few in 
number. 
 
Land, on the other hand, sticks around indefinitely, while 
claims against land can go on and on, in layer after layer, to 
be lost, found, banished, restored, relished, then lost again 
to longstanding practice and prescription.148 
This infinite duration cuts both ways in terms of heterogeneity.  
On one hand, this creates variability because, as Rose indicates, 
claims stack up, never truly expiring.  As such, the laws and rules that 
address and order these claims also stack up and continue on, “layer 
after layer,” in Rose’s words.  This never-ending aggregation leads to 
confusion and the heterogeneity described here.149  On the other 
hand, the unending existence of property means that the revenues 
 
than one third of all state and local government revenue for that time period.”  Id. 
 148  Carol M. Rose, Canons of Property Talk, or, Blackstone’s Anxiety, 108 YALE L.J. 601, 
6l4 (1998).   
 149  It is also likely that land’s fixed geography contributed to said confusion.  See 
Pomeroy, WPH, supra note 9, at 517.  Land is anchored to a single jurisdiction, which 
means that its stakeholders cannot seek out more favorable rules or laws, thereby 
blunting any incentive a jurisdiction might have to evolve away from anachronistic or 
parochial laws.  See id. (citing the Uniform Commercial Code, its adoption by states 
seeking to protect their relative economic interests, and the uniform laws fostered 
thereby as a counter-example).  
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they generate are also (potentially) unending.150  Accordingly, law-
makers (be they kings, state legislatures, or county administrators) 
have an ongoing desire to do what Henry VIII and others have done 
in channeling property into profitable forms and ensuring that they 
stay there.151  This quirky confluence of the state’s profit motive and 
the permanence of the governed object, then, ensures that the 
property form rules that have solidified under the circumstances 
described above, remain static over time. 
An article written by Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky 
discussing the numerus clausus supports this conclusion even 
further.152  Bell and Parchomovsky argue that the numerus clausus is, 
as articulated by Merrill and Smith, overstated.153  In particular, they 
acknowledge the existence of a relatively narrow suite of property 
types but argue that this narrowness is deceiving given the multiplicity 
of states and the federalist nature of American government.154  Each 
state is able to vary the “menu” of property types to suit its own 
purposes, which is in turn given effect between and among states 
pursuant to federalist principles.155  This means that “[f]ederalism 
allows owners to reach beyond a short menu of forms, making the 
number of property forms variable over time and between the 
states.”156  Spousal and joint property rights are prime examples.157 
 
 
 150  See supra note 146 and accompanying text regarding the modern 
manifestations of this enormous revenue stream.   
 151  Contrast this with other ways in which governments raise revenues.  By way of 
example, consider the American income tax system, which seeks to tax present-
period (i.e., annual) income from “whatever source derived.”  See, e.g., Edward J. 
McCaffery & James R. Hines Jr., The Last Best Hope for Progressivity in Tax, 83 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1031, 1041 (2010) (quoting I.R.C. § 61(a) (2013)).  The subject of taxation here 
is a year’s worth of income, a concept that continually changes over time in response 
to economic circumstances and legal ingenuity.  As such, the government must do 
the same, changing and adapting rules, procedures, and definitions in its never-
ending desire to acquire revenue based on “new” types of income.  Now go back to 
the kinds of taxes and fees that flow from property.  These revenue streams, 
consisting largely of recording and transfer fees, see supra note 146, focus not on an 
open-ended notion like “income.”  Instead, they focus on a concrete thing known as 
“property.”  As such, these sources of revenue will vanish if what we consider to be 
“property” is permitted to evolve away from the tax laws, as written.  So the 
government forecloses that by forbidding evolution, thus creating property form 
homogeneity.   
 152  See generally Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 43. 
 153  See id. at 75–76. 
 154  See id. 
 155  See id. 
 156  Id. at 76.  
 157  See id. at 76–77. 
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This criticism of Merrill and Smith’s explanation of the numerus 
clausus makes sense and does appear to weaken Merrill and Smith’s 
informational burden analysis.  It is, however, wholly consistent with 
the historical explanation.  The engine behind the historical need for 
form homogeneity is, as discussed herein, revenue.158  Of course, 
revenue flows to a particular jurisdiction.159  It is that, and only that, 
jurisdiction that cares about the relevant revenue and will take steps 
to protect it.  And, in the case of the revenues flowing from property, 
the relevant jurisdictions are primarily states or state-controlled 
entities.160  It is not at all surprising, then, that the “short menu of 
forms” would vary from state to state as each such taxing entity seeks 
to protect its revenue.161  It is notable, however, that each state, in and 
of itself, strives for consistency.162  Indeed, that is precisely what one 
would predict, based on the governmental history of securing 
property-based revenue streams outlined herein. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Property is a wonderful area of the law, not least because it is so 
uniquely fractured among the many different states.  Of course, the 
well-known exception to this is the area of property form, which is 
widely acknowledged as generally static and uniform in nature.  This 
homogeneity has received a lot of attention in the last decade or so, 
largely due to the numerus clausus theory formulated by Merrill and 
Smith as an explanation for this curious state of affairs.  This Article 
argues, however, that much of this attention has been misplaced.  
 
 158  See supra notes 101–144 and accompanying text. 
 159  See, e.g., George Mundstock, The Tax Import of the FASB/IASB Proposal on Lease 
Accounting, 32 VA. TAX REV. 461, 472 (2013) (noting that tax flows to the “relevant 
taxing jurisdiction”). 
 160  See supra notes 145–146 and accompanying text (indicating that the tax 
revenues and other fees arising from property largely arise from recording fees, 
transfer taxes, and other taxes levied by local, not federal, entities). 
 161  Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 43, at 76. 
 162  See generally id. (focusing on the variability that can arise through federalism, as 
opposed to variety that arises in-state).  See also Sumner v. Borders, 98 S.W.2d 918 
(Ky. 1936).  As discussed above, see supra note 98, this case turned upon a state 
statute, which stated that, “[u]nless a different purpose appear by express words or 
necessary inference, every estate in land created by deed or will, without words of 
inheritance, shall be deemed a fee simple or such other estate as the grantor or 
testator had power to dispose of.”  Id. (citing KY. STAT. 2342).  Thus, the 
homogeneity supported by this case came not from a concern about informational 
burdens or from a federal statute but from a statute promulgated by the 
governmental entity most likely to be concerned about property-based revenue.  This 
again supports my theory that property form homogeneity is based on a historical 
concern for revenue protection. 
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While Merrill and Smith’s theory and its attendant informational 
burdens analysis is ingenious in design, it does not withstand careful 
scrutiny and so cannot really explain the matter of property form 
homogeneity.  Instead, we must look to the history of property law 
stretching back to 13th century English statutes.  These statutes, 
shaped by the legal and economic climate existing at the time of their 
promulgation, effectively arrested the development of different 
property forms and explain why property began to develop along this 
path, and the fact that the forces that shaped those statutes are still 
with us explains why the inertia of homogeneity never left us.  In the 
end, then, property is shaped by us, and we never change. 
 
